On rationalizability in extensive games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On rationalizability in extensive games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0887.90185
author: Pierpaolo Battigalli
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1998-05-06T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 1069870
zbMATH Keywords: extensive form rationalizability
zbMATH Keywords: iterated weak dominance
zbMATH Keywords: backward induction
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.1996.2252
OpenAlex ID: W2005618319
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1996.2252
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1069870