Incentive contracts in two-sided moral hazards with multiple agents
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Incentive contracts in two-sided moral hazards with multiple agents
zbMATH Open document ID: 0887.90044
author: Nabil I. Al-Najjar
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1998-05-06T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 1143.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 1069874
zbMATH Keywords: contracting
zbMATH Keywords: optimal incentive schemes
zbMATH Keywords: principal-agent contracts
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2084740179
cites work: Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1996.2253
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1069874