A model of agreements in strategic form games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A model of agreements in strategic form games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0889.90173
author: Marco Mariotti
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1998-06-04T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 1069875
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium for the bargaining procedure
zbMATH Keywords: coalitional contingent threat situation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.1996.2251
OpenAlex ID: W2012168807
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1996.2251
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1069875