Voting under constraints
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Voting under constraints
zbMATH Open document ID: 0892.90007
author: Jordi Massó
author: Alejandro Neme
author: Salvador Barberà
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1998-01-05T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 1080406
zbMATH Keywords: intersection property
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proof mechanisms
zbMATH Keywords: median voter principle
zbMATH Keywords: impossibility theorems
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.1997.2301
OpenAlex ID: W2002196310
cites work: Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
cites work: Generalized median voter schemes and committees
cites work: Voting by Committees
cites work: A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
cites work: Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
cites work: Generalized median social welfare functions
cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
cites work: Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
cites work: Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof
cites work: The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1997.2301
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1080406