Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
zbMATH Open document ID: 0892.90047
author: Yosef Blum
author: Alvin E. Roth
author: Uriel G. Rothblum
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1998-01-05T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
zbMATH DE Number: 1080409
zbMATH Keywords: senior level labor markets
zbMATH Keywords: two-sided matching markets
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2083091948
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1997.2307
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1080409