Strategy-proofness and ``median voters''
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strategy-proofness and ``median voters''
zbMATH Open document ID: 0888.90006
author: Stephen Ching
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 1998-02-01T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10722/177668
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
zbMATH DE Number: 1111564
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: single-peaked preferences
zbMATH Keywords: augmented median-voter solutions
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W1992903091
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DOI: 10.1007/S001820050047
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1111564