Dynamic stability in symmetric extensive form games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Dynamic stability in symmetric extensive form games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0888.90175
author: Ross Cressman
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 1998-02-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 1111567
zbMATH Keywords: backwards induction procedure
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic stability.
zbMATH Keywords: evolutionary game
zbMATH Keywords: high degree of decomposability
zbMATH Keywords: pervasive equilibria
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s001820050050
OpenAlex ID: W2094244189
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DOI: 10.1007/S001820050050
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1111567