Voting games and acyclic collective choice rules
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Voting games and acyclic collective choice rules
zbMATH Open document ID: 0886.90023
DOI: 10.1016/0165-4896(94)00770-9
author: Michel Truchon
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 1998-01-26T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 1109463
zbMATH Keywords: aggregation of preferences
zbMATH Keywords: collective choice rules
zbMATH Keywords: voting games
zbMATH Keywords: acyclicity
Wikidata QID: Q56763767
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0165-4896(94)00770-9
OpenAlex ID: W1994373105
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1109463