Games with imperfectly observable commitment
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Games with imperfectly observable commitment
zbMATH Open document ID: 0899.90168
author: Sjaak Hurkens
author: Eric van Damme
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 1998-02-05T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A65
zbMATH DE Number: 1113476
zbMATH Keywords: noisy Stackelberg equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: models of commitment
zbMATH Keywords: first-mover advantage
zbMATH Keywords: pure strategy equilibria
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3087638670
cites work: Commitment and observability in games
cites work: The tracing procedure: A Bayesian approach to defining a solution for n- person noncooperative games
cites work: A new theory of equilibrium selection for games with complete information
cites work: Q3997197
cites work: Learning by forgetful players
cites work: Persistent equilibria in strategic games
cites work: On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
cites work: Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
cites work: Q3975611
cites work: Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
cites work: Q4610958
DOI: 10.1006/GAME.1997.0524
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1113476