Reputation with noisy precommitment
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Reputation with noisy precommitment
zbMATH Open document ID: 0895.90199
author: David K. Levine
author: César Martinelli
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1998-04-01T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: cesar11.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A65
zbMATH DE Number: 1136544
zbMATH Keywords: long-run player
zbMATH Keywords: private information
zbMATH Keywords: Stackelberg leader
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2088752236
cites work: Commitment and observability in games
cites work: Games with imperfectly observable commitment
cites work: Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
cites work: Reputation and imperfect information
cites work: Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1997.2344
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1136544