Learning through reinforcement and replicator dynamics
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Learning through reinforcement and replicator dynamics
zbMATH Open document ID: 0892.90198
author: Tilman Börges
author: Rajiv Sarin
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1998-04-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91E40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 92D15
zbMATH DE Number: 1136554
zbMATH Keywords: stochastic learning
zbMATH Keywords: replicator dynamics
zbMATH Keywords: evolutionary game theory
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W1995622844
Wikidata QID: Q57918121
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1997.2319
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1136554