Efficient and non-deteriorating choice.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Efficient and non-deteriorating choice.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1042.91023
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00021-0
author: Walter Bossert
author: Yves Sprumont
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2003-07-29T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 1956085
zbMATH Keywords: Social choice
zbMATH Keywords: Efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: Individual rationality
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1956085