The effectiveness of English auctions.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The effectiveness of English auctions.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1048.91051
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00005-8
author: Zvika Neeman
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2003-07-30T00:00:00Z
review text: The performance of English auctions is studied under different assumptions concerning the seller's degree of ``Bayesian sophistication''. The effectiveness of an auction is defined as the ratio between the expected revenue it generates for the seller and the expected valuation of the object to the bidder with the highest valuation. Tight lower bounds on the effectiveness of the English auction are identified for general private-values environments and for private-values environments where the bidders' valuations are non-negatively correlated.
reviewed by: Giacomo Bonanno
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 1956991
zbMATH Keywords: worst case
zbMATH Keywords: second-price auction
zbMATH Keywords: private values
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: s0899-8256(03)00005-8
OpenAlex ID: W2066957841
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1956991