Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1049.91039
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00542-0
author: Lars Ehlers
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2003-07-30T00:00:00Z
review text: A problem of choosing location in the unit interval [0,1] for identical public goods is considered. The finite number of agents is characterised by a complete, transitive, continuous, and single-peaked preference relation over [0,1]. The preferences are extended from [0,1] to a set of alternatives. The proposed lexicographic extension, called single-plateaued preference rule, is Pareto-optimal, anonymous, and population monotone.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
zbMATH DE Number: 1956997
zbMATH Keywords: preference relation
zbMATH Keywords: lexicographic
zbMATH Keywords: multiple public goods
zbMATH Keywords: single-peaked preferences
reviewed by: Antanas Žilinskas
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Self-selection consistent functions
cites work: Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
cites work: Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
cites work: Independence axioms for the provision of multiple public goods as options
cites work: Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences: Replacement principle
cites work: Population monotonic solutions on convex games
cites work: Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good
cites work: Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy
cites work: Locating libraries on a street
cites work: Fair division under joint ownership: Recent results and open problems
cites work: Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility
cites work: Pazner-Schmeidler rules in large societies
cites work: The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
cites work: The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences
cites work: Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
Recommended article: Strategy-proof allocation when preferences are single-plateaued.
Recommended article: Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle
Recommended article: The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences
Recommended article: Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: characterizing target set correspondences
Recommended article: Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences
Recommended article: Independence axioms for the provision of multiple public goods as options
Recommended article: Single-peaked preferences, endowments and population-monotonicity.
Recommended article: Multiple equilibrium under CES preferences
Recommended article: Choice correspondences for public goods
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1956997