Information in conflicts.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Information in conflicts.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1048.91054
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00006-1
author: Karl Wärneryd
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2003-07-30T00:00:00Z
review text: Most of economic theory focuses on the analysis of voluntary market transactions with well- defined property rights. But many real-world market transactions involve an outright conflict. Here the effect of asymmetric information in such conflicts is investigated. A conflict itself is modeled as a two-player contest. It is supposed that in the contest the participants make efforts or expenditures in order to increase their probability of winnig a prize or object. A case of two agents competing for a price that would be of the same value to both if both knew the value with certainty, but it is assumed this value is uncertain. It is noted that from the point of view of auction theory the most interesting result in the paper is the mildly paradoxical observation that the uniformed player in an asymmetric information contest wins the object with stricly higher probability than the informed player, something that cannot happen in a first-price auction.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91-02
zbMATH DE Number: 1957018
zbMATH Keywords: market transactions
zbMATH Keywords: contest
zbMATH Keywords: asymmetric information
reviewed by: Sergei Georgievich Zhuravlev
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
cites work: The value of information in a sealed-bid auction
cites work: Contest success functions
cites work: On the existence and uniqueness of pure Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1957018