Entry, exit, and imperfect competition in the long run.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Entry, exit, and imperfect competition in the long run.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1060.91098
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00002-4
author: Rabah Amir
author: Val Eugene Lambson
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2003-07-30T00:00:00Z
review text: An infinite-horizon, stochastic model of entry and exit with sunk cost and imperfect competition is constrained. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the general dynamic stochastic game is shown to exist as a limit of finite-horizon equilibria. It tends to exhibit an excessive entry and insufficient exit relative to a social optimum.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B70
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A25
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A15
zbMATH DE Number: 1957022
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic games
zbMATH Keywords: integer constraints
reviewed by: Alexandra Rodkina
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Continuous stochastic games of capital accumulation with convex transitions
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cites work: Q4226167
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full work available at URL: s0022-0531(03)00002-4
OpenAlex ID: W2070073247
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1957022