On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1057.91025
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00033-4
author: Hanming Fang
author: Sérgio O. Parreiras
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2003-07-30T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 1957029
zbMATH Keywords: auctions
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Q3996777
cites work: Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
cites work: Equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders: The two-bidder case
cites work: Q5615180
cites work: Q3976515
cites work: A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
cites work: The Value of Public Information in Monopoly
cites work: Q5526189
full work available at URL: s0022-0531(03)00033-4
OpenAlex ID: W2089936379
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1957029