The evolution of rationality and the Red Queen.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The evolution of rationality and the Red Queen.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1052.91023
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00084-X
author: Arthur Robson
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2003-08-17T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
zbMATH DE Number: 1965051
zbMATH Keywords: bounded recall
zbMATH Keywords: repeated game
zbMATH Keywords: Incomplete information
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: s0022-0531(03)00084-x
OpenAlex ID: W2033569522
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1965051