Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1042.91057
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00130-3
author: Michael Peters
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2003-08-17T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
zbMATH DE Number: 1965054
zbMATH Keywords: contracts
zbMATH Keywords: pure strategy equilibria
zbMATH Keywords: Bertrand pricing problem
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Common Agency
cites work: Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
cites work: Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment
cites work: A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
cites work: Unobserved Delegation
cites work: Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty
cites work: The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
cites work: Selecting equilibria in common agency games
cites work: Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
full work available at URL: s0022-0531(03)00130-3
OpenAlex ID: W2022566622
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1965054