Convergence to no arbitrage equilibria in market games.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Convergence to no arbitrage equilibria in market games.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1064.91005
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(03)00013-2
author: Leonidas C. Koutsougeras
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 2003-08-17T00:00:00Z
review text: This paper considers the non-Walrasian strategic market games introduced by Shapley and Shubik which feature multiple posts for each commodity. It is shown that asymptotically the law of one price holds, as the number of market participants tends to infinity. It is also shown that as the number of markets increases, the set of equilibria is nested upwards.
reviewed by: Srinivas Raghava Mohan
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 1965137
zbMATH Keywords: multiple posts
zbMATH Keywords: arbitrage
zbMATH Keywords: law of one price
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: A strategic market game with complete markets
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cites work: Q3335464
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cites work: Approximate Efficiency of Non-Walrasian Nash Equilibria
full work available at URL: s0304-4068(03)00013-2
OpenAlex ID: W2127847126
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1965137