Closed-loop equilibrium in a multi-stage innovation race
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Closed-loop equilibrium in a multi-stage innovation race
zbMATH Open document ID: 1048.91020
author: Kenneth L. Judd
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2003-08-20T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 647.pdf
review text: The purpose of this paper is to investigate a multistage model of an R and D race where the players have multiple projects. The author uses perturbation methods for general dynamic games that can be expressed as analytic operators in a Banach space. This paper contains also an analysis of the problem of computing second order asymptotically valid solutions for an equilibrium and socially optimal decisions to determine qualitative properties of an equilibrium. Moreover the author find that innovators invest relatively too much on risky projects. Strategic reactions are ambiguous in general; in particular, a player may increase expeditures as his opponent moves ahead of him.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A25
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B38
zbMATH DE Number: 1968464
zbMATH Keywords: perturbation methods
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic games
reviewed by: N. G. Gamkrelidze
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3123092447
DOI: 10.1007/S00199-002-0310-Y
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1968464