Evolutionary foundations of aggregate-taking behavior
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Evolutionary foundations of aggregate-taking behavior
zbMATH Open document ID: 1112.91005
author: Alex Possajennikov
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2003-08-20T00:00:00Z
review text: Let \((N,u(s))\) be asymmetric normal form game symmetric aggregate-taking equilibrium \(s_*\) of this game satisfies the conditions for a generalized Walrasian equilibrium, where each player at \(s^*\) takes aggregate behavior as given. A symmetric evolutionary equilibrium \(s^\wedge\) has the property that no mutation from \(s^\wedge\) does better than \(s^\wedge\) in a population playing \(S^\wedge\). The paper gives necessary and sufficient conditions for an interior symmetric aggregate-taking equilibrium \(s^*\) to be a symmetric evolutionary equilibrium \(s^\wedge\).
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 1968476
zbMATH Keywords: Evolution
zbMATH Keywords: Aggregate-taking
zbMATH Keywords: Aggregative games
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-002-0261-3
OpenAlex ID: W1965983707
DOI: 10.1007/S00199-002-0261-3
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1968476