Recursive structure and equilibria in games with private monitoring
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Recursive structure and equilibria in games with private monitoring
zbMATH Open document ID: 1058.91012
author: Massimiliano Amarante
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2003-09-28T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90C39
zbMATH DE Number: 1986285
zbMATH Keywords: Incomplete information
zbMATH Keywords: Dynamic programming
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-002-0322-7
OpenAlex ID: W2043243507
DOI: 10.7916/D873733G
DOI: 10.1007/S00199-002-0322-7
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1986285