A dual characterization of incentive efficiency.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A dual characterization of incentive efficiency.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1064.91052
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00064-4
author: Belén Jerez
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2003-10-15T00:00:00Z
review text: The paper shows that in the context of two problems of resource allocation under informational asymmetries, generating adverse selection and moral hazard problems, the incentive efficient allocations, i.e. the set of Pareto optimal allocations within the set of resource feasible and incentive compatible allocations, can be determined as solutions to a linear programming problem. It then goes on to use the primal and dual problems and the associated complementary slackness conditions to obtain a precise and simple characterization of these allocations.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
zbMATH DE Number: 1993332
zbMATH Keywords: Asymmetric information
zbMATH Keywords: Incentive efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: Linear programming
zbMATH Keywords: Duality
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Competitive equilibria with asymmetric information
cites work: Duality in semi-infinite programs and some works of Haar and Carathéodory
cites work: On Representations of Semi-Infinite Programs which Have No Duality Gaps
cites work: An expository note on individual risk without aggregate uncertainty
cites work: Recent contributions to linear semi-infinite optimization
cites work: Perfect competition in the continuous assignment model
cites work: Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
cites work: Linear functionals on spaces of continuous functions
cites work: The law of large numbers with a continuum of i.i.d. random variables
cites work: Lotteries, sunspots, and incentive constraints
cites work: Q4197615
cites work: Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
cites work: Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
cites work: Cooperative games with incomplete information
cites work: Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
cites work: General Competitive Analysis in an Economy with Private Information
cites work: A theory of hyperfinite processes: The complete removal of individual uncertainty via exact LLN
cites work: A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1993332