Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1076.91014
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00071-1
author: Masaki Aoyagi
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2003-10-15T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 1993335
zbMATH Keywords: Collusion
zbMATH Keywords: Auction
zbMATH Keywords: Repeated games
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Collusion and Price Rigidity
cites work: Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities
cites work: Low-Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending-Bid Auctions
cites work: An Approach to Communication Equilibria
cites work: The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
cites work: Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
cites work: A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
cites work: Multistage Games with Communication
cites work: Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
full work available at URL: s0022-0531(03)00071-1
OpenAlex ID: W2157771656
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1993335