Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1068.91059
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00096-6
author: David Gale
author: Ahmet U. Alkan
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2003-12-04T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 2012978
zbMATH Keywords: stable matching
zbMATH Keywords: two-sided market
zbMATH Keywords: lattice
zbMATH Keywords: revealed preference
zbMATH Keywords: choice function
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: s0022-0531(03)00096-6
OpenAlex ID: W2034883132
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2012978