Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1069.91015
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00116-7
author: Amparo Urbano
author: José E. Vila
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2004-02-02T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 2035821
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: communication mechanism
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2035821