Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1069.91084
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00047-2
author: Marilda Sotomayor
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2004-02-02T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 2035824
zbMATH Keywords: Core
zbMATH Keywords: Pairwise-stable matching
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: s0899-8256(03)00047-2
OpenAlex ID: W2025422974
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2035824