The effectiveness of weighted scoring rules when pairwise majority rule cycles exist.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The effectiveness of weighted scoring rules when pairwise majority rule cycles exist.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1069.91024
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00080-5
author: William V. Gehrlein
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2004-02-02T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 2035829
zbMATH Keywords: condorcet winners
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Q3266133
cites work: Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?
cites work: A representation for quadrivariate normal positive orthant probabilities
cites work: Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules
cites work: Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: Different perspectives on balanced preferences
cites work: Obtaining representations for probabilities of voting outcomes with effectively unlimited precision integer arithmetic
cites work: The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters
cites work: Scoring rules, Condorcet efficiency and social homogeneity
cites work: Explaining all three-alternative voting outcomes
cites work: Probabilities of preferences and cycles with super majority rules
cites work: Extending Condorcet's rule
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2035829