Endogenous entry in auctions with negative externalities
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Endogenous entry in auctions with negative externalities
zbMATH Open document ID: 1074.91010
DOI: 10.1023/A:1026212810214
author: Isabelle Brocas
published in: Theory and Decision
publication date: 2004-02-03T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 2037053
zbMATH Keywords: Auctions
zbMATH Keywords: Commitment
zbMATH Keywords: Coordination
zbMATH Keywords: Externalities
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2037053