Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1059.91066
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00109-1
author: Karsten Fieseler
author: Thomas Kittsteiner
author: Benny Moldovanu
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2004-02-03T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B60
zbMATH DE Number: 2037163
zbMATH Keywords: Efficient trade
zbMATH Keywords: Lemons
zbMATH Keywords: Partnerships
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: s0022-0531(03)00109-1
OpenAlex ID: W3021333274
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2037163