A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1059.91010
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00120-0
author: Rohan Pitchford
author: Christopher M. Snyder
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2004-02-03T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A25
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
zbMATH DE Number: 2037173
zbMATH Keywords: incomplete contracts
zbMATH Keywords: Contribution
zbMATH Keywords: games
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: s0022-0531(03)00120-0
OpenAlex ID: W3123241437
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2037173