Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1059.91008
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00124-8
author: D. Gerardi
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2004-02-03T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B52
zbMATH DE Number: 2037174
zbMATH Keywords: Correlated equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: Communication equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: Sequential equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: Revelation principle
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
cites work: Long Cheap Talk
cites work: Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
cites work: A battle-of-the-sexes game with incomplete information
cites work: Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
cites work: Correlation without mediation: Expanding the set of equilibrium outcomes by ``cheap'' pre-play procedures
cites work: Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
cites work: Strategic Information Transmission
cites work: Perfect correlated equilibria
cites work: An Approach to Communication Equilibria
cites work: Universal Mechanisms
cites work: Sequential Equilibria
cites work: Mediated talk
cites work: One-shot public mediated talk
cites work: Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games
cites work: Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
cites work: Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
cites work: Multistage Games with Communication
cites work: Q3999542
cites work: Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games
full work available at URL: s0022-0531(03)00124-8
OpenAlex ID: W3123052421
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2037174