Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1059.91030
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00128-5
author: Andrzej Skrzypacz
author: Hugo A. Hopenhayn
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2004-02-03T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 2037176
zbMATH Keywords: repeated games
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
cites work: Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
cites work: Collusion and Price Rigidity
cites work: The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
cites work: Q3976515
cites work: A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
full work available at URL: s0022-0531(03)00128-5
OpenAlex ID: W2063487923
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2037176