All equilibria of the Vickrey auction.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: All equilibria of the Vickrey auction.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1059.91025
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00104-2
author: Andreas Blume
author: Paul Heidhues
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2004-02-03T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 2037177
zbMATH Keywords: Second-price sealed-bid auction
zbMATH Keywords: Reserve price
zbMATH Keywords: Uniqueness
Wikidata QID: Q56658230
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Symmetric separating equilibria in English auctions
cites work: Equilibria in open common value auctions
cites work: Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price
cites work: Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
cites work: Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
cites work: Q4064159
cites work: Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information
full work available at URL: s0022-0531(03)00104-2
OpenAlex ID: W2128790636
DBLP publication ID: journals/jet/BlumeH04
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2037177