Two-person repeated games with finite automata
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Two-person repeated games with finite automata
zbMATH Open document ID: 1062.91011
author: Abraham Neyman
author: Daijiro Okada
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2004-03-07T00:00:00Z
review text: Two-person repeated games are studied in which there is a bound on the complexity of strategies for only one of the players. The complexity of a strategy is defined as the smallest number of states of an automaton required to implement it. The asymptotic behavior of the set of equilibrium payoffs is studied as the bound on the strategic complexity of the restricted player tends to infinity, but sufficiently slowly.
reviewed by: Giacomo Bonanno
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 2051497
zbMATH Keywords: repeated game
zbMATH Keywords: finite automata
zbMATH Keywords: complexity
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s001820000040
OpenAlex ID: W1989293560
DOI: 10.1007/S001820000040
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2051497