Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1064.91023
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00120-9
author: Andreas Blume
author: Tone Arnold
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2004-05-27T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 2066841
zbMATH Keywords: Game theory
zbMATH Keywords: Language
zbMATH Keywords: Learning
zbMATH Keywords: Communication
zbMATH Keywords: Information transmission
zbMATH Keywords: Cheap talk
zbMATH Keywords: Evolution
zbMATH Keywords: Meaning
zbMATH Keywords: Incentive alignment
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: s0899-8256(03)00120-9
OpenAlex ID: W2017584471
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2066841