Learning to play Bayesian games.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Learning to play Bayesian games.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1064.91024
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00121-0
author: Eddie Dekel
author: Drew Fudenberg
author: David K. Levine
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2004-05-27T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 2066843
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2066843