Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1085.91501
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00122-2
author: Federico Echenique
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2004-05-27T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A18
zbMATH DE Number: 2066846
zbMATH Keywords: Strategic complementarities
zbMATH Keywords: Supermodular games
zbMATH Keywords: Subgame-perfect
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: Dynamic games
zbMATH Keywords: Tarski's fixed point theorem
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2066846