Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1064.91039
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00126-X
author: Jinwoo Kim
author: Yeon-Koo Che
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2004-05-27T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 2066848
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Efficient Auctions
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2066848