The \textit{ex ante} incentive compatible core of the assignment game.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The \textit{ex ante} incentive compatible core of the assignment game.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1076.91028
author: Françoise Forges
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2004-06-11T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 2073664
zbMATH Keywords: assignment game
zbMATH Keywords: core
zbMATH Keywords: incentive compatible mechanism
zbMATH Keywords: matching
zbMATH Keywords: private information
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.mathsocsci.2003.07.004
OpenAlex ID: W2144409094
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DOI: 10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2003.07.004
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2073664