Stochastic games without perfect monitoring
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Stochastic games without perfect monitoring
zbMATH Open document ID: 1090.91011
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2004-07-07T00:00:00Z
review text: This paper deals with a two-person zero-sum stochastic game with finitely many states and actions. The classical assumption of perfect monitoring is relaxed. Instead of being informed of the previous action of his opponent, each player receives a random signal, the lay of which depending on both previous actions and on the previous state. The existence of the max-min and the min-max is shown. The result in this paper extends both the result of Mertens-Neyman about the existence of the value in the case of perfect monitoring and a theorem obtained by the author on a subclass of stochastic games: the absorbing games.
reviewed by: Xianping Guo
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A15
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 2078298
zbMATH Keywords: Maxmin
zbMATH Keywords: Puiseux
author: J. M. Coulomb
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s001820300151
OpenAlex ID: W2009614891
DOI: 10.1007/S001820300151
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2078298