A Shapley value representation of potential games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A Shapley value representation of potential games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0966.91005
author: Takashi Ui
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2001-08-14T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: https://ynu.repo.nii.ac.jp/
review text: In this paper, a characterization of potential games is presented: An \(n\)-player game \(G\) is a potential game in the sense of \textit{D. Monderer} and \textit{L. S. Shapley} [Games Econ. Behav. 14, 124-143 (1996, Zbl 0862.90137)] if and only if there is a family of cooperative games \(G_a\) (indexed by the strategy \(n\)-tuples \(a\) of the game \(G\)) such that the payoff function for player \(i\) at \(a\) is equal to the Shapley value of \(G_a\) for player \(i\) (Theorem 2).
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 1454802
zbMATH Keywords: potential games
zbMATH Keywords: Shapley value
reviewed by: Benedikt Löwe
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2128727659
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DOI: 10.1006/GAME.1999.0729
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1454802