Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions?
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions?
zbMATH Open document ID: 1127.91332
author: Colin M. Campbell
author: Dan Levin
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2000-06-04T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 1454811
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.1999.2600
OpenAlex ID: W2072493099
cites work: Competitive bidding and proprietary information
cites work: Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price
cites work: An asymptotic solution for sealed bid common-value auctions with bidders having asymmetric information
cites work: The value of information in a sealed-bid auction
cites work: A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
cites work: Optimal Auction Design
cites work: Note—Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information Reanalyzed
DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1999.2600
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1454811