The selectope for games with partial cooperation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The selectope for games with partial cooperation
zbMATH Open document ID: 0983.91008
DOI: 10.1016/S0012-365X(99)00294-0
author: N. Jiménez
author: E. Lebrón
author: Jésus Mario Bilbao
author: Hans Peters
published in: Discrete Mathematics
publication date: 2002-04-23T00:00:00Z
review text: The paper studies two related solution concepts (the selectope and the Weber set), both defined as the convex hull of a set of imputations, in the context of cooperative games where not all coalitions are allowed to form. The relation of these concepts with the core is studied for families of feasible coalitions satisfying certain structural properties (closedness with respect to intersection, union, addition of a player). In the almost positive games where the cooperational structure satisfies all the restrictions considered, it is shown that both solution concepts coincide with the core.
reviewed by: Salvatore Modica
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90C27
zbMATH DE Number: 1455599
zbMATH Keywords: cooperative games
zbMATH Keywords: core
zbMATH Keywords: cooperational structure
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1455599