Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
zbMATH Open document ID: 0983.91033
author: Yossi Feinberg
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2002-04-23T00:00:00Z
review text: Roughly speaking, the Common Prior Assumption (CPA) means that rational agents in models with asymmetric information have a common prior. \textit{R. J. Aumann} [Ann. Stat. 4, 1236-1239 (1976; Zbl 0379.62003)] proved that if CPA holds then agents cannot agree to disagree. In the present paper the converse statement is proved under an appropriate compactness condition. Also an example is given which demonstrates that the compactness assumption cannot be discarded. For a characterization of the CPA, the author adopts two distinct formalisms: the semantic and the syntactic.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 62C05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
zbMATH DE Number: 1484856
zbMATH Keywords: common prior assumption
zbMATH Keywords: consistency condition
reviewed by: Rimas Norvaiša
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.1999.2592
OpenAlex ID: W2033059935
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1999.2592
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1484856