Manipulation through bribes
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Manipulation through bribes
zbMATH Open document ID: 0955.91031
author: James Schummer
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2001-03-04T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 1207.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
zbMATH DE Number: 1484857
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proof
zbMATH Keywords: bribe
zbMATH Keywords: manipulation
zbMATH Keywords: collusion
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2105478153
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1999.2618
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1484857