A recursive formulation for repeated agency with history dependence
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A recursive formulation for repeated agency with history dependence
zbMATH Open document ID: 1006.91052
author: N. Delaunay
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2000-08-06T00:00:00Z
review text: The paper deals with the problem of designing incentive mechanisms in dynamics environments where privately observed variables are linked over time, or where common knowledge of preferences over continuation contracts is violated. More specifically, starting from the Green's privately observed endowment model, the authors derive recursive methods to handle the aforementioned dynamic environments; an extension of agency theory to more realistic environments. Moreover, they show that incentive compatible contracts are implemented recursively with a threat keeping constraint in addition to the usual temporary incentive compatibility and promise keeping constraints.
reviewed by: Vangelis Grigoroudis
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B76
zbMATH DE Number: 1484859
zbMATH Keywords: economies
zbMATH Keywords: environmental
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: sr.259
OpenAlex ID: W3121207922
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1999.2619
DOI: 10.21034/SR.259
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1484859