Asymptotic efficiency in dynamic principal-agent problems
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Asymptotic efficiency in dynamic principal-agent problems
zbMATH Open document ID: 0957.91070
author: Holger M. Müller
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2000-09-25T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B62
zbMATH DE Number: 1484862
zbMATH Keywords: Brownian motion
zbMATH Keywords: discrete time
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.1999.2623
OpenAlex ID: W2000141013
cites work: Q3969647
cites work: Q3354678
cites work: Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmstrom-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision
cites work: Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
cites work: Q4108109
cites work: The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
cites work: The first-best sharing rule in the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility
cites work: The first-order approach to the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility
DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1999.2623
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1484862