Entry-deterring policy differentiation by electoral candidates
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Entry-deterring policy differentiation by electoral candidates
zbMATH Open document ID: 0952.91066
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00040-2
author: Martin J. Osborne
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2000-09-25T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B72
zbMATH DE Number: 1491046
zbMATH Keywords: electoral competition
zbMATH Keywords: political competition
zbMATH Keywords: entry
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
cites work: Candidate positioning and entry in a political competition
cites work: Q3576736
cites work: A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
cites work: Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
cites work: A theory of policy differentiation in single issue electoral politics
cites work: On Hierarchical Spatial Competition
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1491046